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I. INTRODUCTION
John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust' and Jesse H. Choper's Judicial
Review and the National Political Process2 share a broad common ground-
namely, that an adequate constitutional theory should focus on function and
process, in particular, on the broad concern whether nonjudicial institutions
fairly represent diverse interests and, in those cases in which they do not, on
the special role of judicial review in securing that representation. Choper uses
this general proposition to defend his principal substantive proposal: the
Supreme Court should review neither federalism disputes between the states
and the national government3 nor separation of power disputes between
Congress and the executive.4 In these contexts, Choper asserts, relevant
interests are already fairly represented. Indeed, Choper affirmatively argues
that in adjudicating these disputes the Court depletes its "exhaustible institu-
tional capital, ' 5 and undermines its essential role-the defense of individual
rights that, he assumes, are precisely marked as interests not well represented
in the democratic political process.6 Ely's book is a detailed defense of his
assumption that the essential justification for judicial review is protection of
groups and interests not fairly represented in the democratic political pro-
cess.7 Since I wish here to examine this assumption, I focus largely on Ely's
book and its arguments. In particular, to establish the defensibility of his
analysis, Ely makes a frontal attack on alternative conceptions of judicial
review, including conceptions involving appeal to what he calls "fundamental
values. " 8 Since these negative arguments are an important foundation for his
constructive alternative, their invalidity may cast doubt on his enterprise. In
this essay, I argue that his arguments are invalid, indeed startlingly specious.
Nonetheless, I urge that we not regard their invalidity as a defeat of Ely's
constructive argument, which makes a solid contribution to understanding
certain doctrines in constitutional law-notably, suspect classification analy-
* Professor of Law, New York University. A.B., Harvard College 1966; D. Phil., Oxford University 1970;
J.D., Harvard Law School 1971; member, New York bar.
1. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) [hereinafter cited as
ELY].
2. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980) [hereinafter cited as CHOPER].
3. See generally id. at 171-259.
4. See generally id. at 260-379.
5. For Choper's elaboration of this idea, see id. at 129-70.
6. See, e.g., id. at 64, 75, 79, 223.
7. See ELY, supra note I, at 73-183.
8. See id. at 43.
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sis under the fourteenth amendment. But even this constructive contribution
turns out, on examination, to rest upon the kind of substantive moral analysis
against which Ely appears to rebel in his earlier negative arguments.
II. ELY ON FUNDAMENTAL VALUES
While Ely's attack on the role of fundamental values in the supposed
vindication of judicial review is multifaceted, it also is unified by its focus
upon the work of Alexander Bickel, who, at different points in his career as a
constitutional theorist, appealed to different forms of this mode of vindica-
tion: first, in The Least Dangerous Branch,9 to the method of moral philos-
ophy in explicating fundamental values; second, in The Supreme Court and
the Idea of Progress,'° to the values revealed by historical progress; and,
finally, in The Morality of Consent," to Burkean tradition. Ely finds indefen-
sible each of Bickel's forms of the argument in support of the role of funda-
mental values, 2 and criticizes other forms of it as well, including the legal
realist appeal to the values of an enlightened judge, 3 the appeal to natural
law, 4 the ideal of neutral principles, 5 and the invocation of consensus. 6 No
form of the argument is valid, Ely argues, because the values to which appeal
is made are always deeply controversial, because there is no method reason-
ably to resolve them, and because-in any event-the judiciary is no better,
and may be worse, than the more democratic branches of government in
giving expression to these values.
A. Controversial Nature of Value Questions
Ely's initial attack on the role of fundamental values in judicial review-
that the values to which appeal is made are deeply controversial-does not
appear to rest on any subjectivist conception of value questions as such. Ely
concedes: "There are ethical positions so hopelessly at odds with assump-
tions most of us hold that we would be justified in labeling them (if not with
absolute precision) 'irrational'." 17 In addition, while Ely appears to recognize
that contemporary moral philosophy has decisively repudiated the moral sub-
jectivism that was in fashion' 8 (briefly and without ever attaining dominance )
9. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1%2).
10. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970).
II. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975).
12. On moral philosophy, see ELY, supra note I, at 56-60; on progress, see id. at 69-70; on tradition, see id.
at 60-63, 71-72.
13. Id. at 44-48.
14. Id. at 48-54.
15. Id. at 54-55.
16. Id. at 63-69.
17. Id. at 52.
18. For examples of recent moral philosophy that inquires into a determinate structure of moral reasoning.
see K. BAIER, MORAL POINT OF VIEW (1958); R. BRANDT, A THEORY OFTHE GOOD ANDTHE RIGHT (1979);
A. DONAGAN, THE THEORY OF MORALITY (1977); C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG (1978); D. GAUTHIER,
PRACTICAL REASONING (1963); B. GERT, THE MORAL RULES (1973); A. GEWIRTH, REASON AND
MORALITY (1978); G. GRICE, THE GROUNDS OF MORAL JUDGMENT (1967); R. HARE. FREEDOM AND
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during his undergraduate years, '2 0 he thinks it important to distinguish the very
general and abstract character of moral argument, which character no reason-
able person would dispute (citing, without attribution, but familiar from
Dworkin,2' the "jejune maxim... 'No one should profit from his own
wrong' ,,),2.2 from the level of concrete controversy relevant to the work of the
Supreme Court in deciding hard constitutional cases. For Ely, the force of the
distinction appears to be that the former class of moral values, which might be
appropriately enforced by a countermajoritarian court, is irrelevant to judi-
cial work, while the latter class, though relevant, is too controversial to be a
proper guide to judicial decision.
It is difficult to see how the distinction can be given the force that Ely
supposes it to have. If we grant the existence of reasonable general premises
of the kind that Ely concedes, it does not follow that because there exists
disagreement about how the premises apply in concrete cases, these disa-
greements may not be reasonably adjudicated. Indeed, it is surely an impor-
tant datum in such cases that persons take themselves to be in significant
disagreement about something, and then suppose the others wrong and them-
selves right. It is natural, in such cases, to think that if each party were more
impartial (less personally involved, more broadly capable of weighing other
points of view, more free from pressure and other demands, more fully reflec-
tive on underlying facts and other contexts in which the premises in common
apply, and the like), they could lessen and perhaps even resolve their disagree-
ment. Certainly, persons acting on their own sometimes cultivate this impar-
tiality. In serious matters, parties often appeal to others who are supposedly
independent and impartial to resolve the matter. This common sense moral
phenomenon is, I believe, continuous with what we see in and hope to achieve
from formal adjudication. Thus, Ely is surely wrong to think that the imparti-
ality that is so importantly promoted by an independent federal judiciary has
no natural institutional place in resolving disputes.2
Ely may not, however, understand what he has conceded in granting the
existence of general premises which reasonable persons could not deny.
There is some evidence for this in the interpretation he gives to the shift in
REASON (1963); R. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS (1952); J. MACKIE, ETHICS (1977); J. RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); D. RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION (1971). These philosophers
differ on many issues. Some, for example, are utilitarians (Hare, Brandt). Others are militantly anti-utilitarian
(Gewirth. Rawls, Richards). Some are noncognitivist (Hare. Mackie) in the sense that they do not analyze
ethical statements on the model of statements about the world. Still others are cognitivist (Gewirth, Rawls,
Richards). All. however, regard ethics as establishing determinate forms of reasoning, subject to critical assess-
ment in terms of canons of validity and adequacy.
19. The classic statements of subjectivist ethics are in A. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC (1936)
and C. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE (1944). For a very useful summary of the classic difficulties with
this position. see R. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY 203-40 (1959).
20. ELY. supra note I, at 53.
21. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 23-28 (1977).
22. See ELY, supra note I, at 65.
23. For a further elaboration of this theme, see Richards, The Theory of Adjudication and the Task of the
Great Judge, I CARDOZO L. REV. 171 (1979).
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philosophy from his undergraduate years. For, interpreting these arguments
as moving from principles the reader accepts to others not clearly accepted
prior to the argument, Ely concludes that "reasoning about ethical issues is
not the same as discovering absolute ethical truth,-24 as if the method of
contemporary philosophers in exploring ordinary moral judgments somehow
means that the valid moral arguments thus developed are true only in virtue of
being accepted. This is nonsense. The method used is not novel; it has been
inherited from a philosophical tradition in ethics begun by Socrates, and
many of its classic and contemporary practitioners expressly reject Ely's
positivistic interpretation of the theories their method yields. Classic moral
philosophers who have used this method (Plato,26 Aristotle,27 Kant, 8
Sidgwick,29 for example) regard it as a way of discovering the more basic
principles and concepts on which ethical reasoning rests; none of these
philosophers (who, of course, argue for quite different moral theories) sup-
pose the principles thus articulated to be anything but valid arguments, and
often criticize ordinary moral judgments in terms of them. Contemporary
moral philosophers are to similar effect: when moral theorists like Hare or
Gewirth3' or Rawls 32 develop comprehensive theories of ethical concepts and
substantive moral principles of complexity and sophistication, they suppose
their theories to determine the structure of valid moral argument.
Perhaps Ely has meant to grant the existence of general premises, while
at the same time noting that there are so many of them in such degrees of
possible conflict that committing resolution of their concrete applications to
the "first-rate lawyers ' 33 who man the federal judiciary is fraught with special
dangers of ideological distortion. Following a long American legal realist
tradition initiated by Holmes, 4 Ely's criticism of Natural Law3 certainly
harps on its socially regressive uses, for example, to justify the subjection of
women, the enslavement of blacks,37 and, of course, Lochner.38 It is, how-
24. See ELY, supra note I, at 54.
25. Consider, for example, Socrates' method of questioning Euthyphro about "the essential form of
holiness which makes all holy actions holy." PLATO, Euthyphro, in PLATO: THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES 174
(E. Hamilton & H. Cairns ed. 1961).
26. See note 25 supra.
27. Aristotle observes: "Therefore, we should start perhaps from what is known to us. For that reason, to
be a competent student of what is right and just, and of politics generally, one must first have received a proper
upbringing in moral conduct." NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1095a3-6 (1962).
28. See I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 20 (1969).
29. See generally H. SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS (7th ed. 1962).
30. See R. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS (1952); R. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON (1965).
31. A. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY (1978).
32. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); D. RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION4
(1971).
33. See ELY, supra note 1, at 59.
34. Holmes' famous appeal to wash the law in cynical acid derives from The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REV. 457, 462 (1897). Cf. Holmes' derogatory reference to viewing the common law as "a brooding omnipres-
ence in the sky" rather than as "the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be identi-
fied." Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For an example of the
application of the method, see 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (DeWolfe ed. 1963).
35. ELY, supra note I, at 48-54.
36. See id. at 50-51.
37. Id. at 51.
38. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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ever, a non sequitur to argue that attempts to articulate fundamental values
are misplaced in all cases merely because efforts to enforce fundamental
values in some cases reflect a false, indeed evil, theory of justice. Holmes,
after all, while critical of the Spencerian theory of economic justice 9 that is
implicit in Lochner,40 himself deployed against a hostile Court a Millian theory
of justice in free speech matters. 41 There are better and worse theories of
justice, of human rights, of the social good. So why is the lesson of the
Natural Law cases not that all appeals to fundamental values are misplaced,
but that there are better and worse values, and that educators, in particular,
had better start imparting this difference to the "first-rate lawyers'' 42 they
train-to teach them to question and criticize their own values, to warn them
against ideological distortion, and to cultivate in them a balanced and respon-
sible moral impartiality? Why not, in short, look to the methods of moral
philosophy? Understandably, Ely must direct his criticism against this possi-
bility.
B. The Method of Moral Philosophy
The intellectual heart of Ely's argument against a role for fundamental
values in constitutional interpretation is and must be that there is no appro-
priate role for moral philosophy in assisting this task. It is surprising, then,
that his argument here is so brief (about four pages),43 and, as I shall argue, so
bad. The argument is roughly this: contemporary moral philosophers (Rawls'
A Theoty of Justice44 and Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia45 are
adduced) disagree and therefore "[t]here simply does not exist a method of
moral philosophy.", 46 In addition, since the "first-rate lawyers" 47 who, as
judges, would implement these theories, are from "the upper-middle, profes-
sional class, ,48 their interpretation of them would be distorted by ideological
motives.
As an initial matter, it is very puzzling, and not at all supportive of Ely's
argument, that he should cite Rawls and Nozick. It is true that Rawls and
Nozick disagree about the substantive morality of redistributive justice
(Rawls' difference principle calls for considerable redistribution to the advan-
tage of the worst-off classes; 49 Nozick's theory forbids all compulsory redis-
tribution, except when done to remedy past affirmative wrongs 0), but their
39. See id. at 75-76 (Holmes. J., dissenting). For a very useful analysis of the premises of Spencer's theory
of justice, see D. MILLER, SOCIAL JUSTICE 180-208 (1976).
40. See notes 38 and 39 supra.
41. See, e.g.. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); J. MILL, ON
IBERTY 15-54 (1946).
42. See ELY, supra note I. at 59.
43. Id. at 56-60.
44. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (197 1).
45. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
46. ELY, supra note I, at 58.
47. Id. at 59.
48. Id.
49. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 65-108 (1971).
50. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 149-231 (1974).
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disagreement over this issue is hardly one of much serious moment to
American constitutional law. Nozick's theory is the theory of Lochner,51 and,
as such, has little constitutional vitality in a period, such as today, when the
Lochner approach appears historically anachronistic. 2 Rawls and Nozick
agree on much else that is relevant to current constitutional controversy. For
example, both recognize the broad priority of the Bill of Rights guarantees to
other political values53 and interpret these rights in terms of Kantian values of
autonomy and personhood;54 and both make a broad commitment to the right
of personal autonomy and thus to the defense and expansion of the scope of
the constitutional right to privacy 5 and to a rights-based justification of
judicial review to the extent necessary to preserve these fundamental
values.5 6 In short, the convergences between these quite anti-utilitarian,
counter-majoritarian moral theorists powerfully support the role of judicial
review to enforce fundamental values. Ely, in short, uses examples here that, if
he studied their substance, would contradict his thesis.
But, let us grant, arguendo, that there are contemporary moral philos-
ophers, besides Rawls and Nozick, whose general moral theories would
contradict completely the defense of judicial review that Rawls and Nozick
appear to endorse (for example, a utilitarian in Bentham's line of intransigent
opposition to all ideas of human or moral rights). 7 Why should it follow from
the fact that moral philosophers disagree, in ways of substantive moment to
the disposition of hard constitutional cases, that moral philosophy, as such,
may not aid judges in explicating fundamental values? Why, in particular,
should this disagreement show, as Ely concludes, that there is not "a method
of moral philosophy"? 58 Here the non sequitur is startling, for serious moral
51. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
52. For a useful critique of the moral confusions on which Nozick's argument depends, see Hart, Between
Utility and Rights, in THE IDEA OF FREEDOM 77-98 (A. Ryan ed. 1979); R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 259 (1977); Nagel, Libertarianism Without Foundations, 85 YALE L.J. 136 (1975); Richards, Book
Review, 1976 DET. C. L. REV. 675.
53. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 195-257 (1971). See also R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE. AND
UTOPIA 3-146 (1974).
54. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 251-57 (1971). See also R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE. AND
UTOPIA 32-33 (1974).
55. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 251-57 (1971). For an interpretation of Rawls' perspective that
lends clear support for the right to personal autonomy, see Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional
Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1979).
See also R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE. AND UTOPIA 28-35 (1974).
56. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 195-257 (197 1). See also R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE. AND
UTOPIA (1974).
57. See Bentham, Anarchial Fallacies, in 2 J. BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 491-529
(1843). But, in fact, it should be emphasized that subsequently prominent utilitarians have insisted that Bentham
is wrong in this doctrinaire opposition, and that, in fact, ideas of human and natural rights can be shown to rest
on solid utilitarian foundations. The most notable and influential of these utilitarians is John Stuart Mill. See J.S.
MILL, UTILITARIANISM 52-79 (1951). See also J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 15-54 (1946). There is every reason to
believe that Mill (and, I suspect, many contemporary utilitarians) would try to use such arguments in the United
States to support a mode ofjudicial review that would incorporate many of Rawls' recommendations. See, e.g.,
Bayles, Morality and the Constitution, 1978 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 561. Thus, the example in the text, made solely for
purposes of argument, may be quite idle.
58. ELY, supra note I. at 58.
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philosophy today, as has been the case since Socrates, 9 shares a common
method-namely, the attempt to explicate ordinary and considered moral
judgments in a self-critical and reflective way.60 Ely is simply wrong here.
Even if the substantive theories thus generated were in conflict on all moral
questions, their common method might be stimulating in a judge something
that is sorely needed-a sense of self-criticism, of differing perspectives on
the same issue, of the possibility of ideological distortion.6'
There have, of course, been substantive moral theories that were in deep
conflict in some such ways; the perfectionism of Aristotle and Nietzsche is, I
believe, in such conflict with the broad egalitarian perspective of utilitarian-
ism and Kantian natural rights. 62 But contemporary moral theory is not thus
divided; the two main contenders for basic normative perspective, utilitari-
anism and contractarian natural rights, both are rooted in the interpretation of
treating persons as equals, 63 and contemporary exponents of these theories
often, though not always, 64 converge in substantive recommendations. 65 But
why must moral theories converge in all substantive recommendations before
moral theory, as such, may aid the judicial search for fundamental values?
Here, as in the former argument from the controversiality of values, Ely's
idea appears to be that controversy must mean there is no right answer.66 The
argument was mistaken earlier and is wrong here. That moral philosophers
disagree about ethical questions does not remotely imply that any of them
supposes such questions are not rightly or wrongly decided; the whole
premise of the discussion, indeed, is that this is not so.
The analogy to scientific theory and the philosophy of science is, I
believe, apt.67 Scientists debate their conflicting scientific theories and philos-
ophers of science their conflicting views of the nature of those debates, but in
59. See note 25 supra.
60. For a very useful characterization of this method, see J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 17-22 (1971).
Rawls, Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics, 60 PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 177 (1951). See also D.
RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION 3-10 (1971).
61. See Richards, The Theory of Adjudication and the Task of the Great Judge, I CARDOZO L. REV. 171
(1979).
62. See D. RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION 110-20 (1971).
63. 1 explore this thought further in Justice and Equality, which will appear in a forthcoming volume of
essays edited by Don VanDeVeer and Tom Regan (Rowman and Littlefield).
64. See, e.g., the recent utilitarian theories of Jonathan Glover and Peter Singer, who take views on the
permissibility of infanticide with which rights theorists might substantively disagree. See generally J. GLOVER,
CAUSING DEATH AND SAVING LIVES 150-69 (1977); P. SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 122-26, 131-38 (1979).
For the opposing view of a rights theorist, see P. DEVINE, THE ETHICS OF HOMICIDE 46-73 (1979). See also
Richards, Constitutional Privacy, the Right to Die, and the Meaning of Life: A Moral Analysis, WM. & MARY
L. REV. (forthcoming).
65. Consider, for example, the many substantive convergences between the recent utilitarian theory of
Brandt, and the anti-utilitarian theories of Rawls and Gewirth. See R. BRANDT, A THEORY OFTHE GOOD AND
THE RIGHT (1979); A. GEWIRTH. REASON AND MORALITY (1978); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
See also note 57 supra.
66. For a general analysis of the fallacy that Ely's argument exemplifies, see Dworkin, No Right Answer?,
in LAW, MORALITY AND SOCIETY 58-84 (1977).
67. For the diversity of views on issues in scientific theory and the philosophy of science, see B. BRODY,
READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (1970); F. SUPPE, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES
(1977).
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neither case do we or they suppose that their controversy means that no one
can be right. The point is, of course, just the opposite. Moral theory and moral
philosophy, we are beginning to understand, 6' are in no different position.
Serious philosophical controversy, at the level of depth and subtlety of
Sidgwick's utilitarianism in The Methods of Ethics69 or Rawls' antagonist
Kantian reconstruction in A Theory of Justice,70 rests on the assumption that
one or the other must be right. And, both may be useful.
Ely's mistake is a lawyer's mistake; he thinks of moral theories in the
same way that he views legal precedents closely on point-two seemingly
valid precedents cannot dictate contradictory legal results. But the existence
of conflicting moral theories is not to be thought of in terms of their differ-
ences in substantive recommendation. Rather, a reasonable decision on con-
flicting recommendations can be coherently expressed only in terms of an
examination of each theory's background arguments. Ely never thinks of or
contemplates this kind of examination by judges because he focuses on sub-
stantive result, not philosophical method.
In the context of constitutional cases, this reflection is further con-
strained by the history of legal authority, by the need to fit the moral con-
cepts, given philosophical analyses, into the texture of ongoing legal argu-
ments, and by the ways in which, if at all, legal argument draws on moral
argument.7' Quite apart from the relative merits of different moral theories in
explicating ordinary, considered moral judgments, one moral theory may
better fit than another the forms of legal arguments, and thus have a prior
claim on judges seeking to understand the underlying moral concepts upon
which legal controversy turns. In the understanding of constitutional cases,
Dworkin's appeal to Rawls'72 theory is of this kind: whatever the abstract
plausibility of Rawls' theory as a general moral theory, it fits characteristic
forms of constitutional argument (for example, the priority of free speech and
religious tolerance among political values) much more naturally and coher-
ently than alternative moral theories, and thus, on this ground, may have a
special claim on judicial attention.73
Again, Ely notes that judges cannot grapple with it, for "commentators
on Rawls' work have expressed reservations about his conclusions.- 74 But
68. For an important expression of the continuity of moral and scientific theory, see H. PUTNAM, MEAN-
ING AND THE MORAL SCIENCES 83-94 (1978).
69. See note 29 supra. For commentary on this remarkable book and philosopher, see 1. SCHNEEWIND.
SIDGWICK'S ETHICS AND VICTORIAN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1977).
70. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
71. See generally R. DWORKIN, Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-130 (1977).
72. See id. at 149.
73. See generally D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW (1977). The most striking gap between
Rawls' substantive theory and present constitutional practice is, of course, the difference principle. This is
because the Court does not afford the right to an economic minimum the weight which the difference principle.
on some views, requires. For criticism of constitutional practice on this ground, see Michelman, In Pursuit of
Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973). See also
Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976).
74. EI.Y. supra note 1, at 58.
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what, precisely, is the nature of the reservations that Ely has in mind? Critics
from the libertarian right, like Nozick, attack, as we have seen, the difference
principle; 75 but, if we were just counting up points of agreement (as Ely
appears to require before judges may consult moral theory), there is more
than enough here to support the fundamental values approach to judicial
review.76 Critics from the socialist left attack the difference principle for not
being egalitarian enough,"7 or for being, in all cases, secondary to the pursuit of
liberty.78 But, again, the points of substantive agreement are enormous,
79
certainly sufficient to satisfy Ely's requirement. And critics both from the
right and left share various common premises with Rawls so that, again, Ely
should be satisfied.
But, any philosopher would be appalled that moral theory's usefulness
could be assessed in so unreflective and result-oriented a way. Philosophers
are interested in cultivating self-reflective argument, in assessing conflicting
views, and in this way, in cultivating a more encompassing and flexible moral
impartiality. They are interested, in short, in argument, and their "reserva-
tions" about Rawls' "conclusions" 80 focus on general argument of such kind.
Ely never inquires into such argument, citing, instead, another legal commen-
tator's quite cursory statement8 ' about the enormous literature of philosophi-
cal commentary that followed Rawls' book, which statement does not even
cite the literature, let alone discuss its arguments.
How can legal theorists thus suppose themselves to have adequately, let
alone responsibly, done justice to a philosopher of Rawls' stature when they
studiously refuse to discuss arguments, focusing instead on facts of disagree-
ment? If they did so inquire, they would have themselves to engage in
philosophical argument, for example, about whether Nozick is right that
natural talents and their exercise are so irreducibly one with one's person that
any redistributive taxation of income yielded from them is a violation of one's
personhood,82 or whether Rawls is not more correct to argue, from Kantian
premises of the moral irrelevance of everything fortuitous for which the
person is not responsible, 83 that one's talents are no more ethically funda-
mental to one's person than one's race, and that special rewards for their
exercise are just only if their benefits are equitably shared on the terms of the
difference principle. Why is it assumed that American judges cannot engage in
75. See R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 149-231 (1974).
76. See notes 53-56 and accompanying text supra.
77. See, e.g., Nielsen, Class and Justice, in JUSTICE AND ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION 225-45 (1978).
78. See, e.g., B. BARRY, THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE 59-82 (1973); Daniels, Equal Liberty and
Unequal Worth of Liberty, in READING RAWLS 258-81 (N. Daniels ed. 1975)
79. In particular, socialists often argue that the difference principle, correctly interpreted, expresses the
moral ideals of socialism in a usefully precise way. See, e.g., Nielsen, Class and Justice, in JUSTICE AND
ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION 225-45 (1978).
80. See ELY, supra note I. at 58.
81. The citation is to B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 284 n.47 (1977).
82. The able philosophical discussion of this argument is by H.L.A. Hart. See Hart, Between Utility and
Rights, in THE IDEA OF FREEDOM 77-98 (A. Ryan ed. 1979).
83. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 251-57 (1971).
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or profit from such argument when, in fact, many of them (Holmes, Brandeis,
Cardozo leap to mind) evinced real capacity for philosophical reflection?8
Why is it not important, indeed vital, for judges to learn to see constitutional
controversy in this deeper way? Why, as lawyers, should we acquiesce in the
preposterous assumption that judges are incapable of profiting from any range
of philosophical theories that happen to disagree, when it may be the point of
the method of moral philosophy that it can see disagreement at some superfi-
cial level as the consequence of deeper levels of agreement, and thus, can
cultivate balance and perspective?
In this connection, we should note a shift in Ely's tone in the short argu-
ment on which we have here fastened. While he is quite capable of engaging in
arguments of enormous rigor and complexity and fairmindedness, his argu-
ment at this point becomes polemical and jazzily dismissive. The remarks
about controversy over Rawls' book are followed by: "The Constitution may
follow the flag, but is it really supposed to keep up with the New York Review
of Books?" 85 Or, the use of differing philosophical theories by judges is
parroted as: "We like Rawls, you like Nozick. We win, 6-3. Statute inval-
idated."8 6 Why is Ely's dearth of good argument at this point wedded with
this tone, which is, to a philosopher, contemptuously dismissive? I suggest it
is because he is extremely uncomfortable with the discussion of these issues,
that he would rather have found some way of not entering this hornet's nest of
philosophical agon, and that, therefore, he relieves his ambivalence by dis-
missing what he thinks himself unable to examine properly. This will not do.
Ronald Dworkin is correct that lawyers and constitutional theorists must
come to grips with the "better philosophy ... now available,'"'r one
certainly better than in Ely's undergraduate years. Either that, or they must
learn the grace of not discussing issues they do not want to discuss responsi-
bly.
C. The Capacities of Judges for Moral Reasoning
Even if we grant that neither the argument from controversy nor the
argument from lack of consensus in moral philosophy works, there remains
the argument that, in any event, judges are no better suited to resolve such
controversies or to deploy philosophical methods than other more democrati-
cally responsive institutions. Ely makes this argument in many guises, includ-
ing the historic tendency of "first-rate lawyers ' 88 to distort these moral judg-
ments by their middle class bias, which includes notable distaste for substan-
tive economic rights for the poor.89 Now, this oft-repeated bromide should not
84. See generally Richards. The Theory of Adjudication and tile Task of the Great Judge, I CARDOZO L.
REV. 171 (1979).
85. ELY. supra note I, at 58.
86. Id.
87. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 149 (1977).




go unchallenged. Certainly, it is simply not true that a lower class background
is either a necessary or sufficient condition for having a developed sense of
the injustices to the poor; some poor people, for example, may be more
imbued with a distaste for equality as a political ideal than people of more
advantaged backgrounds." And certainly, if we disqualify political theories
that define injustices to the poor on the ground that their authors lack prole-
tarian credentials, we would, absurdly, exclude the egalitarian social theory
of Marx and the moral theory of Rawls.
But perhaps Ely means to speak of legal culture alone, emphasizing, for
example, the regressive use of Natural Law by American "first-rate
lawyers," 9' who are undoubtedly under the influence of class ideology.
Certainly, this historical phenomenon, which is a constant tendency in legal
analysis, requires very careful analysis. Ely is correct to identify part of the
problem in the legal culture of "neutral principles," 92 which, while it may
supply a necessary condition of proper adjudication in hard cases, 93 fails to
emphasize how weak a requirement this is, how decisions in conformity to it
may be deeply wrong, and how it may be-as it has been-abused to challenge
prematurely humane evolutions of legal principle on the basis of unimagina-
tive legalism. 94 Properly understood, the criticism is a criticism of legal educa-
tion and the hermetic examination of legal principles in appellate decisions
that it enshrines, without reference either to a broader social context or to
underlying moral argument or political theory. The regressive uses of Natural
Law and of neutral principles must remain constant examples of the costs that
narrow legal analysis may impose. The answer, I believe, is not Ely's dismis-
sal of moral reasoning as such, but criticism of an education and a culture that
narrows lawyers' conception of legal reasoning in a way that deprives them of
the self-critical capacity to detect and correct the ideological distortion that
such a conception often sanctifies and that disables them from discerning the
larger connections between legal argument, on the one hand, and social
context and moral and political theory on the other. As I earlier suggested,
95
the answer, in short, is the deployment in legal education and legal culture of
the methods of moral philosophy-methods that Ely irrationally dismisses.
His dismissal is, I believe, a symptom of the problem of the enormous gap that
exists between the legal and the larger intellectual culture.
If we think of the use of moral reasoning by lawyers in ways disciplined
by self-criticism and perspective of the kind that philosophy and other disci-
plines afford, there is reason to believe that, so understood, the judicial role
90. See, e.g., C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 208-13 (1977); Lane. The Fear of Equality, 53 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 35 (1959).
91. ELY. supra note I, at 59.
92. Id. at 54-55.
93. See Richards. Rules, Policies and Neutral Principles: The Search for Legitimacy in Common Law and
Constittional Adjudication, II GA. L. REV. 1069 (1977).
94. See id. at 1082-89. 1102-10.
95. See notes 33-42 and accompanying text supra.
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with respect to certain kinds of moral argument may better express and
preserve the integrity of this reasoning than would other branches of govern-
ment. The reason for this, I think, has been made familiar by Ronald
Dworkin:96 the reasoning of judges in hard constitutional cases is a method of
appeal to principle, and these principles in hard constitutional cases often
deploy background moral concepts subject to reasonable elaboration in terms
of self-reflective moral argument. In addition, the institutional independence
of the federal judiciary secures a kind of impartiality in the elaboration of such
legal, and underlying moral, argument. 97 The methods of reasoning of other
branches of government are neither structured by requirements of an articu-
late consistency in the elaboration of underlying principles nor secured by
institutional independence in their impartial exercise. Thus, to the extent that
the underlying principles define basic human rights that the constitutional
design may reasonably be regarded as rendering immune from political com-
promise and bargaining, those principles may be justifiably enforced by
judicial review of the American form.
III. ELY ON FAIR REPRESENTATION
Ely's constructive theory is essentially a theory of fair representation:9
groups or interests are to be accorded countermajoritarian judicial protection
when decisions that compromise or prejudice them are not the products of a
process in which they have had fair representation. The unfairness here is put
by Ely in terms of not affording a process which guarantees that the persons
who decide have been compelled institutionally to treat the persons affected
in the way the persons who decide would want to be treated if they were in the
position of those affected.99 The idea is that groups or interests that are un-
fairly represented in a decision-making process lack the institutional capacity
to assure that those who decide give weight to their interests in this required
way.
In view of Ely's earlier negative arguments against fundamental values, it
is quite puzzling that his constructive theory should so clearly be a form of
moral argument that makes strong substantive moral claims. Put simply, the
argument is that the basic justice of decision-making institutions must be
assessed in terms of whether all affected are treated conformably with what
philosophers call moral universalizability or reciprocity: ° treating others as
one would oneself want to be treated. Ely's special concern for stigmatized
96. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-130 (1977).
97. See Richards, The Theory of Adjudication and the Task of the Great Judge. I CARDOZO L. REV. 171
(1979).
98. See ELY, supra note I, at 73-179.
99. See, e.g., id. at 158.
100. See, e.g., K. BALER, MORAL POINT OF VIEW 187-213 (1958); D. GAUTHIER, PRACTICAL REASON-
ING 81-94 (1963); G. GRICE, THE GROUNDS OF MORAL JUDGMENT 1-35 (1967); R. HARE, FREEDOM AND
REASON 91-94 (1%3); J. MACKIE, ETHICS 83-102 (1977); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 130-32 (1971); D.
RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION 75-91 (1971).
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groups, the subjects of racial or sexual prejudice (blacks, women to some
degree, homosexuals), derives from the fact that decisions affecting these
groups fail to treat them in the way that the decision-makers, if comparably
situated, would wish to be treated, and from the role of judicial review to
guarantee to such groups an equal concern and respect that democratic pro-
cesses deny to them.
Ely may reply that this is a moral argument with a difference, that it rests
on notions of procedural fairness, not substantive morality. First, this is not
true; Ely's account rests on substantive values of treatment as equals, and
forms of treatment that violate this substantive value are condemned. Second,
and strikingly, if this account is procedural, many of the philosophers whom
Ely cavalierly swept into the dustbin of illegitimate fundamental values must
also be regarded as affording processual theories; Rawls, for example, surely
assesses questions of basic justice from a not dissimilar perspective of
whether the institutions, overall, treat persons as equals in a fair-minded way.
When we see Ely's constructive theory for what it is-a substantive moral
theory of judicial review-we can see both its proper value and its limitations.
Its value, which has led the Supreme Court to evolve the suspect classifica-
tion prong of equal protection review, is its analysis of the underlying moral
argument-namely, the immorality of forms of prejudice that treat persons not
as persons but as stereotypes and that thus degrade moral personality.'0 ' Ely
takes seriously the social facts of racial prejudice against blacks or gender
prejudice against women or homophobic prejudices against homosexuals, and
morally interprets their constitutional condemnation in terms of background
moral ideals of fairness that are violated by these prejudices. On his analysis,
such prejudices isolate these groups, in varying degrees, from fair representa-
tion in the political process. As a result, Ely asserts that the task of equal
protection is to secure fairer representation, both by striking down invidious
uses of the stereotypes on which such prejudices rest and by forms of affirma-
tive action that realistically take account of the force of such prejudices and
endeavor reasonably to combat them.'02 Much that Ely has here to say is true
and important, combining, in a very unusual and probing way, what this form of
equal protection analysis surely requires-both moral analysis of underlying
wrongs and sensitive assessment of the social facts upon which the analysis
must reasonably turn. Ely's book would be of enormous value alone simply
for the light it casts on the justifiability of affirmative action programs, on
which topic there has been enormous moral and intellectual confusion worked
both by commentators and the Supreme Court of the United States. 3
The limitation of Ely's constructive account comes, I believe, in his
101. For a similar theory, see D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW 162-78 (1977).
102. ELY, supra note 1, at 135-79.
103. With respect to affirmative action programs, both the Supreme Court and commentators have
expressed enormous moral and intellectual confusion. See Richards, Reverse Discrimination and Compensatory
Justice: Constitutional and Moral Theory, in THE VALUE OF JUSTICE 101-48 (V. Kelbley ed. 1979).
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inadequate elaboration of his underlying moral premises. For if the underlying
perspective is that of treating persons as equals and insuring that institutions
reflect this basic moral equality, certainly more would be required from
judicial review than merely protecting stigmatized minorities, or even than
insuring the fairness of the representative structure (through protecting politi-
cal speech, or securing equal voting rights, and the like). t04 Surely, treating
persons as equals requires, at a minimum, not only their fair representation,
but that-no matter how fair the representation--certain rights of the person
remain inviolable. 0 5
There is an ambiguity in the underlying moral ideal upon which Ely's
account rests. Fair representation may be understood at the level of political
decision-making, as Ely indeed interprets it, as insuring open and responsive
political access unclogged by obdurate prejudices. But, for its moral force,
Ely's account also draws on a deeper level of moral values-namely, insuring
that political and other institutions preserve and express the capacity of
persons, as free and rational beings, to establish, on terms fair to all, a life of
dignity and self-respect that is defined in terms of whatever vision of the good
they choose and may, in the independent exercise of their judgment, revise.
These values require fair representation in Ely's sense, but they also require
much more-namely, respect for inviolable aspects of human personality that
just institutions must preserve from political bargaining and compromise.
Ely's account stops at one level of fair representation and thus fails to
express the deeper values of the equality of persons-values which, in fact, it
assumes. This explains why his theory loses touch with the ideas of natural and
human rights on which American constitutionalism builds, and on the concep-
tion of inalienable rights of the person, which cannot, no matter how fair the
decision-making procedures, be transgressed.'06 The consequences of a com-
mitment to such values, in contrast to Ely's view, are real and substantive: a
much extended protection of both free speech and religious liberty (well
beyond the political, or the arguably political)'07 and a concern with the elabora-
tion of a right to personal autonomy in the form of the constitutional right to
privacy. 108
A point of clear controversy here is the extension of constitutional
privacy to abortion,10 an extension that Ely's account appears to condemn
104. Such an insurance is promoted by protecting political speech, serving equal voting rights, etc. See
ELY, supra note 1, at 105-34.
105. For a related form of criticism of Dworkin's theory of rights, which-whatever its validity as applied
to Dworkin's quite complex views-clearly applies to Ely, see Hart, Between Utility and Rights, in THE IDEA
OF FREEDOM 86-97 (A. Ryan ed. 1979).
106. See Richards, Sexual Autonomy, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 958-72 (1979).
107. See, e.g., Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amend-
ment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974).
108. See Richards, Sexual Autonomy, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1979); Richards, Comnmercial Sex and the
Rights of the Person: A Moral Argument for the Decriminalization of Prostitution, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1195
(1979). See also Richards, Constitutional Privacy, the Right to Die, and the Meaning ofLife:A MoralAnalysis,
WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming).
109. Roe v. Wade, 416 U.S. 113 (1973).
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since, if there is here a discrete and insular minority, it arguably might be the
fetuses. "0 Certainly, this kind of approach to privacy analysis indicates that
Ely has stretched his moral theory to the breaking point, requiring, as it does,
always some powerless minority as the controlling predicate of judicial
review. Privacy cases sometimes involve such minorities-homosexuals, for
example" '-but not always. But the moral issue of these cases nonetheless
remains urgently present: has the state, on the basis of arguments that cannot
critically be sustained consistent with the constitutional morality of equal
concern and respect for persons and their capacity to define the meaning of
their own lives as free and rational beings, violated the rights of the person to
determine personal identity and life direction?" 2 Government criminalization
of abortion in early pregnancy may violate this right, or, at least, a plausible
moral argument might be offered to this effect." 3 No one on either side of the
abortion question supposes that the issue is not over such moral arguments.
Ely's dismissal of Roe v. Wade sidesteps the entire question, which suggests
that his theory has here lost contact with moral and human reality.
I have no doubt that, in reply, Ely would cry fundamental values, to
which the reasonable reply is: your negative arguments against them don't
work, your own constructive theory assumes them, and your application of
your theory to the privacy cases arguably fails to square with a reasonable
elaboration of your theory's own moral premises.
110. For a clear statement to this effect, see Ely, The Wages of Crying Wotf: A Connent on Roe v. Wade,
82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
Ill. Paradoxically, this group, which doubly requires protection (both on Ely's grounds and on indepen-
dent privacy grounds), has received none. For criticism, see Richards, Sexual Autonomy, 30 HASTINGS L.J.
957 (1979); Richards, Unnatural Acts a,,d the ConstitutionalRight o Priracy:A Moral Theory, 45 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1281 (1977).
112. See generally Richards. Sexual Autonomy 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1979).
113. For attempts by philosophers which have the unfortunate consequence that young infants are not
persons either, see Tooley, A Defense of Abortion and Infanticide, in THE PROBLEM OF ABORTION 51-91 (J.
Feinberg ed. 1973); Engelhardt, Jr.. The Ontology of Abortion, in MORAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE 318-34
(1976). For an attempt without this consequence, see E. KLUGE, THE PRACTICE OF DEATH 1-100 (1975).
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